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despite having admitted that the
shipowners’case was strong.He reached
the decision in accord with commercial
sense. Given that virtually all
charterparties are concluded by fixture
recap, the judgment is of high
importance, stretching beyond the
confines of the particular clause and
charterparty at issue. Any term not
agreed in the fixture recap but reflected
in the pro-forma charterparty or
standard terms can be considered as
complementary (unless directly
contradictory) and therefore be used in
case of dispute.
The case highlights the significance of
including a provision in fixture recaps
that the terms in the latter will take
precedence over incorporated pro-
forma or standard terms, if disputed.
Alternatively, it is submitted that some
fairly simple modifications in drafting
would help avoid the confusion
resulting from language; such as ‘25,000
mtns pwwd SHINC (Super Holidays
excluded Even if used/Unless Used).
Superholidays as per Bimco Calendar of
General Holidays’, and ‘O/WISE
........C/P TO BE LOGICALLY
AMENDED AS PER ABOVE
MAINTERMS’.
There is no universally recognized
definition of ‘Super holidays’ and usual
practice appears to be either to abide by
the practice of the port in question,or to
define the concept in the charterparty
itself. In the arbitration, all three
arbitrators accepted that ‘SHINC’ per se
would normally include Super holidays.
BIMCO does not recognize the
concept of Super holidays. Its web site
(www.bimco.org,accessed 16 Jan 2010) has
the following to say on the subject
‘BIMCO is not aware of a universally
acknowledged definition of a “Super
Holiday”and it is a term the implication
of which may be obscure even to those
who invented it.’ BIMCO also provides
the following terse warning on the
subject of Super holidays clauses in their
current undeveloped format: ‘Parties
agreeing to that provision will land
themselves in trouble’ and goes on to
point out that parties have thus ‘agreed to
a provision that cannot be implemented
in practice and they may thus be heading
for a nice dispute.’Indeed.
Yiannis Almpanoudis




Marine insurance – inherent vice
Global Process Systems (GPS) were
owners of the oil rig Cender MOPU,
which was being transported from Texas
to Malaysia via the Cape of Good Hope.
The rig was carried above deck with its
legs elevated 300 feet in the air. Syarikat
were the owners’insurers.The insurance
policy incorporated the Institute Cargo
Clauses (A) 1982,providing cover on an
‘all risks’basis.During the voyage,fatigue
cracking occurred as a result of repeated
bending of the rig’s legs.This was caused
by the motions of the barge, which
consequently brought about the loss of
the starboard leg,followed rapidly by the
loss of the other remaining legs. For the
further facts, see the first instance
judgment reported at [2009] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 72,reviewed by Georgiou,KS (2009)
Vol 9 STL 5-6.
Initial observations
Given the lack of definition of inherent
vice in the Marine Insurance Act 1906,
the definition provided by Lord Diplock
in Soya v White [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 122
was accepted by both parties.
Disagreement arose however, in relation
to its interpretation.
Waller LJ rejected the submissions of
Ms Blanchard, counsel for the appellants
(and also editor of Arnould’s Law of Marine
Insurance and Average, 17th ed. 2008)
regarding Moore-Bick J’s judgment in
Mayban General Insurance v Alston Power
Plants [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 609.
Referring to Donaldson LJ in Soya v
White [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 136 and the
17th edition of Arnould 22-26,Waller LJ
confirmed that the exception of
inherent vice was the same in both
carriage by sea and marine insurance.
Waller LJ also held, contrary to Ms
Blanchard’s submission, that there was
no contradiction between NE Neter &
Co Ltd v Licenses and General Insurance Co
Ltd [1944] 4 All ER 341, where Tucker
J held that ‘it is clearly erroneous to say
that because the weather was such as
might reasonably be anticipated there
can be no peril of the seas’ and Moore-
Bick J’s conclusion that if ‘conditions
encountered by the vessel were no more
severe than could reasonably have been
expected, the conclusion must be that
the real cause of the loss was the
inherent inability of the goods to
withstand the ordinary incidents of the
voyage’ (emphasis added). It is hard to
accept this analysis. Reviewing the
authorities,Tucker J held that ‘I think it
is clearly erroneous to say that because
the weather was such as might
reasonably be anticipated there can be
no peril of the seas. There must, of
course, be some element of the
fortuitous or unexpected to be found
somewhere in the facts and
circumstances causing the loss’.Tucker J
subsequently applied his reasoning to
the facts of the case, concluding that
‘such an element exists when you find
that properly stowed casks, in good
condition when loaded, have become
stove in as a result of the straining and
labouring of a ship in heavy weather.’A
factual analysis thus is imperative to
determine some ‘fortuitous element’,
rather than an over-assumptive
conclusion of inherent vice.
Waller LJ agreed with Ms Blanchard,
that an evidential rule stating that,absent
exceptional weather being shown to
have occurred, the loss must be
attributed to inherent vice, would be
incorrect.Yet,Lord Justice Waller did not
regard this as the outcome of the Mayban
decision.Nonetheless,it is submitted that
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the test in Mayban was undoubtedly
incorrect, and it is fortunate that a
narrower test was accepted here (see
below).
Further review of the authorities led
to consideration of the following: 1)
whether Arnould’s view, that a cause was
due to inherent vice if something
internal was the sole cause, was
supported by authority; and if not, 2) in
which circumstances inherent vice
remains a cause, despite other outside
causes; the precise definition of perils of
the sea being fundamental in that regard.
The Judge noted ‘these questions may
well be intertwined since,if perils of the
sea is a cause, that may show inherent
vice was not and vice versa’. An
additional concern was whether both
could be a proximate cause, and the
result that such a finding would produce.
What followed was a painfully extensive
regurgitation of an article by Professor
Howard Bennett (2007 LMCLQ 315)
with little commentary along the way.
The definition of inherent vice
Legal analysis aside, what did Waller LJ
actually decide? The following extracts
have been taken from the judgment:
1) ‘inherent vice can be a cause even
though some outside agency such as
motion of the waves has contributed
causally to the loss.’[56]
2) ‘inherent vice would be the sole
cause where any other outside
causative factor did not amount to a
peril insured against.’[56]
3) ‘inherent vice may not be a
proximate cause if there is an
eventuality or accident from without
that causes the loss.’[57]
4) ‘it would appear difficult to have
concurrent causes where one
candidate is inherent vice.’[57]
5) ‘It is only if a peril insured against is
not a proximate cause that inherent
vice can be the sole and proximate
cause.’[57]
On an initial reading,it seems as though
points 1 and 3 directly conflict; it is
unlikely that this was intentional. It is
tentatively submitted that,at point 3,the
Judge intended to hold that any damage
caused by inherent vice may be
overlooked if some external accident
subsequently caused the remainder (and
importantly, the greater part) of the
damage.This inference is developed from
the differences in the language used to
describe an external cause;‘some outside
agency’versus ‘an eventuality or accident
from without’. The external cause in
point 3 is clearly meant to have a more
significant impact than that in point 1.
The accuracy of Waller LJ’s statement
illustrated at point 4 is also debatable.
Without the addition of ‘proximate’,the
statement is open to attack.Inherent vice
by its very nature requires a concurrent
‘cause’ to take effect – this concurs with
point 1.This cause may be a change in
temperature that causes condensation or
the motion of a barge that causes metal
fatigue in its cargo’s legs. In the instant
case,had the rig been elevated in the air
and not moved, the fatigue cracking
would not have taken place. On the
contrary, difficulties clearly arise where
there are concurrent proximate causes,
one of which is inherent vice,as accurate
determination of culpability is hard to
achieve.
Point 5 is in effect the same as point 2.
The following conclusion can thus be
drawn: if there are potentially two
proximate causes of loss, one being
inherent vice and one being a peril that
is not covered by the insurance policy,
the exclusion of inherent vice will
succeed and an insured’s claim fail.This is
obvious,without inherent vice,the claim
should still fail as the risk would not be
covered.However,it seems as though the
‘basic rules’have changed.In para [32] of
the judgment, Waller LJ restated the
previously accepted basic rules. If there
are two proximate causes one of which is
covered by the policy and one of which
is not but it is not excluded, the policy
must respond. If however, there are two
proximate causes, one of which is
covered and one of which is expressly
excluded, the policy does not respond.
By simple use of the word ‘only’, the
Judge has seemingly reversed the latter
rule;it is only when the proximate cause
of loss is not covered by the policy, that
inherent vice will be considered as the
sole and proximate cause.A co-existent
proximate cause that is covered by the
policy thus has the effect of ousting the
exclusion clause. Without a doubt, this
was not the intention of the insurers.
The correct test for establishing
inherent vice
Waller LJ confirmed that,for accidents at
sea, the burden was on the underwriter
to establish inherent vice as the
proximate cause, which involves
consideration of whether there was
some other external fortuitous event
which caused the loss.The Judge was not
satisfied to ‘simply say’that the event was
caused by perils of the sea,believing that
‘if it is the action of the sea which caused
the loss, there has to be something
beyond the “ordinary” and the question
is by what is the ordinary to be judged.’
[59] The Judge further noted that the
aforementioned question may be
affected by consideration of exactly what
the insurance covered.This approach is
considered as correct.
Further review of authorities, in
particular  The Miss Jay Jay [1985] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 264, led Waller LJ to
conclude that ‘if cargo was damaged by
the motion of the vessel in “favourable
weather” or “perfect weather” the
obvious inference in most cases would be
that any damage was caused by inherent
vice or the nature of the cargo’.[61] This
statement is less strict than that in
Mayban,although extremely comparable.
If cargo is damaged in such weather and
no other cause is found, is it correct to
assume inherent vice? Surely, an
established cause that can be classed as
inherent vice is preferable, even if the
result is less advantageous to cargo
owners than ship owners; ships being of8
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a different species to goods.Also, it may
be argued that this statement conflicts
with para [59] (above).
Waller LJ thus continued ‘in
considering whether damage to cargo
has been caused by inherent ...the answer
cannot be found by reference to what
might be reasonably foreseeable as the
ordinary incidents of that voyage, but by
reference to wind or wave which, it
would be the common understanding,
would be bound to occur as the ordinary
incidents on any normal voyage of the
kind being undertaken.’ The Judge did
stress that ‘this is not equating inherent
vice with certainty but it is recognising
that an insurer would not cover damage
to cargo flowing from the motion of a
vessel in such seas, even if it was not
certain to occur.” Waller LJ has thus
included a test for peril of the seas within
the test for inherent vice,where both are
argued to be causative. Accordingly, the
following is suggested (with hesitation,as
it is frustratingly unclear) as the applicable
test for inherent vice:
a) was the cause (of damage) an inability
to withstand the ordinary incidents
of the voyage? And,
b) were the incidents, ie wind or wave,
on common understanding, bound
to occur as the ordinary incidents on
any normal voyage of the kind being
undertaken?   
If the above interpretation is correct,then
Waller LJ has qualified the test in
Mayban, by providing a secondary
requirement to prove that 1) the incident
was ordinary; 2) the voyage was normal;
and 3) both parties knew that the
incident was bound to occur,(or perhaps,
this is an objective test of common
understanding?) The first two points
highlighted here are easy to prove
factually: weather experts, forecasts, trade
experts etc., and they may even be
merged together.It is the third point that
causes some difficulty, as it is not easy to
prove subjective knowledge. Also, if the
burden initially lies with the insurer to
prove inherent will the insured have the
opportunity of rebutting his evidence?
The original dilemma, whether damage
was caused by a peril of the sea instead of
inherent vice, has now changed
substantially. To prove inherent vice in
such a case, it is now necessary to show
that damage was caused by an ordinary
incident of the voyage undertaken
(which may still be a peril of the sea),
however, it was bound to happen and
both parties were aware of that fact, thus
the inability of the cargo to withstand
such ordinary incident renders the
proximate cause of the loss as inherent
vice.The test has consequently gone from
one extreme to the other.
Application of the ‘narrower’ test
to the instant case
Given the finding by Blair J that the
accident was not a certainty, it was
deemed that he must have concluded
that a ‘leg breaking wave’was not bound
to occur on the voyage.
As a consequence, it was the Judge’s
conclusion that ‘Metal fatigue was not the
sole cause of the loss of the legs. A leg
breaking wave,not bound to occur in the
way it did on any normal voyage round
the Cape of Good Hope, caused the
starboard leg to break off.That led to the
others being at greater risk and then
breaking off. It was not certain that that
would happen and although with the
benefit of hindsight we know that it was
highly probable,that high probability was
unknown to the insured and that was a
risk against which the appellants insured.’
Accordingly,the appeal was allowed.
Further comment
Even though an unsatisfactory judgment,
the practical consequences of the
decision will be welcomed by insureds,as
the exclusion of inherent vice in all risks
insurance has been severely narrowed. If
it is right that inherent vice can only
stand alone as a proximate cause, subject
to contrary proof that the proximate
cause was a peril insured against, the
courts will be required to examine all
causative factors and to reach a definitive
judgment in that regard. Finally, like the
judgment, Waller LJ’s test for inherent
vice is overly complex. The burden of
proof is much more difficult to discharge,
and although the Judge stated that he did
not equate inherent vice with certainty,it
certainly seems that he did.
A longer version of this article is
available on www.i-law.com.
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